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Editor’s Note: This is Part 1 of a three-part series on sustaining paramedic airway readiness. 

The Certification Assumption 

A newly certified paramedic has completed the required education, practiced airway procedures, demonstrated technical skills, and passed formal examinations. The credential confirms that the clinician met an established entry-level standard at a specific point in time. 

Then the paramedic enters practice. 

Weeks may pass without an endotracheal intubation (ETI). In some systems, months may pass. When an appropriate patient finally appears, the clinician may be working in a crowded bedroom, a narrow bathroom, a damaged vehicle, or beside a roadway. The airway may be contaminated. The patient may be deteriorating. The paramedic must retrieve a complex skill under pressure even though there may have been few meaningful opportunities to use it since certification. 

This creates a central problem for EMS: initial certification establishes that a clinician demonstrated competency, but it does not ensure that competency will remain unchanged. 

Procedural competency is perishable. It depends on continuing opportunities to retrieve knowledge, perform component tasks, make decisions, receive feedback, and correct weaknesses. For high-acuity, low-frequency procedures, those opportunities may be too scarce and unevenly distributed to occur naturally. 

The result is an exposure problem. EMS systems continue to authorize clinicians to perform consequential procedures even when the clinical opportunities needed to reinforce those procedures are declining. If agencies do not deliberately replace or supplement lost exposure, time becomes part of the competency equation. 

Certification Is a Starting Point, Not a Maintenance System 

Initial paramedic education is designed to prepare a clinician for entry into practice. Students receive classroom instruction, laboratory practice, simulation, supervised clinical experience, and field education. They demonstrate required competencies under defined conditions. 

Those requirements are necessary. They are not a permanent safeguard against skill decay. 

Certification answers an important question: Did this clinician meet the standard required to enter practice? Sustained competency asks a different question: Does the clinician remain ready to perform safely and effectively now? 

The second question cannot be answered solely by pointing to the first. 

A clinician may remain licensed, complete continuing-education requirements, and satisfy recertification obligations while receiving little recent exposure to a particular procedure. Those activities may confirm continued eligibility to practice, but eligibility and readiness are not identical. Attendance at education does not necessarily demonstrate performance. A credentialing interval does not reveal how long it has been since the clinician last performed or meaningfully practiced a specific skill. 

This distinction is especially important for procedures that combine psychomotor technique, clinical judgment, physiologic management, teamwork, and adaptation. ETI is not merely the act of passing a tube through the vocal cords. The paramedic must determine whether the procedure is appropriate, prepare the patient and equipment, select a first-attempt strategy, maintain oxygenation, recognize difficulty, know when to stop, use a rescue airway when indicated, confirm placement, and manage the patient afterward. 

A clinician can remember the sequence yet become less reliable in executing it. Component movements may become slower. Equipment familiarity may decline. Recognition of a difficult situation may be delayed. More attention may be required for tasks that were once relatively automatic, leaving less cognitive capacity for changing physiology, communication, and rescue decisions. 

For that reason, sustained competency must be treated as something an EMS organization actively maintains, not something certification permanently confers. 

When HALO Procedures Become Rarer 

ETI illustrates a broader category of EMS procedures that are high acuity but low frequency. These HALO procedures may be urgently needed and clinically consequential, yet individual clinicians may encounter them only rarely. Other examples can include cricothyrotomy, needle or finger thoracostomy, pediatric airway management, and complicated childbirth. 

Rarity does not eliminate the expectation of competent performance. It makes meeting that expectation more difficult. 

Research has long connected experience with paramedic intubation performance. Garza and colleagues found that paramedic experience affected orotracheal intubation success, while later studies reported associations between greater intubation experience and successful tube placement.1,3 Research examining paramedic students has likewise described a learning curve in which repeated experience contributes to the development of ETI proficiency.2,4 

The operational problem is that exposure is not distributed evenly. An agency may report a respectable annual number of intubations while some paramedics perform several and others perform none. System-level totals can therefore create an illusion of opportunity that does not exist at the individual level. 

Changes in airway practice can narrow exposure further. Supraglottic airway devices provide an important alternative and may be the appropriate clinical choice in many circumstances. Their availability can improve airway management while simultaneously reducing the number of ETI attempts available to clinicians who are still authorized and expected to perform ETI when needed. 

This is not an argument for performing ETI when another airway strategy is better for the patient. Patient care must take priority over maintaining a clinician’s procedure count. No patient should undergo an invasive procedure merely because a paramedic needs practice. 

It is an argument for organizational honesty. If clinical practice appropriately reduces opportunities to perform a skill, the agency must recognize the resulting maintenance gap and address it through other forms of exposure and assessment. 

The same principle applies to every HALO procedure. EMS cannot wait for the right emergency to appear often enough for every clinician. Chance clinical exposure is inherently unpredictable, ethically constrained, and influenced by assignment, geography, call distribution, scope of practice, and local treatment patterns. 

Waiting is not a competency-maintenance strategy. 

The consequences extend beyond the individual clinician. When an agency cannot see who has experienced prolonged procedural gaps, education remains reactive. Training is scheduled according to the calendar rather than the needs emerging across the workforce. A difficult patient encounter may become the first indication that a skill had weakened. 

The organization also loses the ability to distinguish an isolated performance problem from a system-wide exposure problem. If many clinicians have few opportunities to perform the same procedure, repeated deficiencies may reflect the design of the maintenance program rather than a series of unrelated individual failures. Without individual-level exposure data and longitudinal review, leaders may respond to each event separately while leaving the common cause untouched. 

Recognizing the exposure problem early allows a different response. Clinicians can receive reinforcement before a performance gap reaches patient care, and agencies can direct limited educational resources toward the skills and people with the longest or most consequential gaps. 

Time Without Use Has Consequences 

Procedural skills do not disappear at a single, universal deadline. Decay is influenced by the complexity of the skill, the clinician’s original level of mastery, the quality and frequency of reinforcement, similarity between practice and actual performance, and opportunities to receive feedback. 

Nevertheless, the underlying principle is straightforward: a skill that is not retrieved and used can become less accessible and less reliable. 

The danger is not limited to forgetting a procedural step. Performance may degrade more subtly. A clinician may take longer to assemble equipment, need more effort to recall an alternative technique, or have difficulty adapting when the first approach fails. Under routine training conditions, those delays may appear minor. During a hypoxic airway emergency, they can matter. 

Low-frequency procedures also place unusual demands on memory. The clinician must retrieve technical and clinical knowledge under conditions that can include time pressure, noise, confined space, deteriorating physiology, unfamiliar team members, and concern about the consequences of failure. When component tasks are well practiced, some actions require less conscious attention. When familiarity declines, those same tasks consume more cognitive capacity. 

That leaves fewer mental resources available for the larger clinical problem. 

This helps explain why competency maintenance cannot be reduced to remembering an algorithm. The paramedic must be able to execute, monitor, interpret, and adapt while the patient changes. The longer the gap since meaningful practice or performance, the less confidently an organization should assume that a prior demonstration still represents current readiness. 

Why Procedure Counts Are Not Enough 

Procedure counts are useful. They show whether a clinician is receiving exposure and can identify long intervals without opportunities. They can also help leaders understand how experience is distributed across a workforce. 

But a count is evidence of activity, not proof of competency. 

Two paramedics may each record five intubations and possess very different readiness profiles. One may have achieved consistent first-pass success, selected appropriate patients, maintained oxygenation, recognized difficulty, and received timely feedback. The other may have required repeated attempts, demonstrated questionable decision-making, or completed the procedures without structured review. 

The number is identical. The performance is not. 

Counts also conceal the conditions under which procedures occurred. Five uncomplicated airways do not necessarily prepare a clinician for contamination, restricted positioning, rapidly declining oxygen saturation, or failed equipment. Conversely, a lower number of carefully supervised clinical experiences combined with deliberate practice and meaningful feedback may contribute more to readiness than a larger number of poorly reviewed attempts. 

Even the definition of an “attempt” may vary. Agencies may count insertion of the laryngoscope, attempted passage of the tube, or completed procedures differently. Without consistent definitions, numerical thresholds can create an appearance of precision while comparing unlike events. 

A minimum count may serve as one component of an educational or credentialing standard. It should not become a substitute for observing performance and judgment. 

The more useful questions include: 

  • How long has it been since the clinician last practiced the procedure? 
  • How long has it been since the clinician last performed it on a patient? 
  • What happened on the first attempt? 
  • Was the procedure indicated and the strategy appropriate? 
  • Were complications recognized and managed? 
  • Was feedback provided? 
  • If a weakness was identified, was the clinician remediated and reassessed? 

These questions place procedure counts within a larger picture. Exposure matters, but exposure must be connected to performance. 

When Thresholds Become False Reassurance 

Numerical thresholds can be attractive because they appear objective. A requirement that each clinician complete a specified number of attempts is easy to communicate, document, and audit. Once the threshold is reached, the record appears complete. 

The difficulty is deciding what the number actually proves. 

A threshold may indicate that the clinician received a minimum amount of exposure. It does not establish that the experiences were sufficiently varied, that performance met an appropriate standard, or that competency was retained after another prolonged gap. A clinician can reach a required number through closely spaced experiences and then perform no additional procedures for the remainder of the year. Another may receive fewer opportunities but demonstrate strong performance during recent simulation, supervised clinical exposure, and actual case review. 

The number should therefore function as a signal, not a verdict. 

Below-threshold exposure should prompt agencies to ask what reinforcement is needed. Reaching the threshold should not prevent them from examining first-pass success, decision quality, complications, rescue-airway use, or time since the most recent performance. The same principle applies to training repetitions. Completing ten attempts on a familiar device does not necessarily provide more convincing evidence than completing fewer attempts across changing anatomy, positioning, equipment, and clinical conditions with observation and feedback. 

Thresholds are most useful when incorporated into a broader standard. They can help ensure that exposure is not ignored, but they should be interpreted alongside direct evidence of how the clinician performed and whether that performance remained stable over time. 

Used this way, procedure counts contribute to competency assessment without being mistaken for competency itself. 

The Risk of Depending on Chance 

Some EMS systems implicitly rely on field calls to maintain competency. Clinicians are trained, placed into service, and expected to stay proficient through the patients they encounter. 

That approach fails for HALO procedures because patient encounters do not arrive according to educational need. 

One clinician may encounter several significant airways in a short period. Another may work the same number of shifts without performing one. A third may encounter a critically difficult airway after a prolonged period without practice. None of those clinicians controls the distribution. 

Chance exposure also provides inconsistent educational quality. A patient encounter may offer no direct observation by an experienced evaluator. Documentation may focus on clinical and billing requirements rather than the details needed for competency review. Feedback may be delayed or absent. A successful outcome may prevent anyone from examining weaknesses in the process, while an unsuccessful procedure may be judged without adequate attention to the patient’s condition or the appropriateness of rescue decisions. 

Actual patient care is indispensable evidence of performance, but it becomes educational only when the organization learns from it. Significant encounters should be reviewed, feedback should reach the clinician, and lessons should return to practice. Otherwise, agencies are not maintaining competency through experience. They are merely hoping that experience is sufficient. 

Why Annual Training Cannot Carry the Entire Burden 

Annual airway training is better than no structured reinforcement, but its interval is poorly matched to a perishable, low-frequency skill. 

A paramedic can successfully complete an annual competency station and then go many months without another meaningful airway encounter. The training record remains current while the underlying performance becomes increasingly distant from the event used to validate it. 

Annual sessions also face practical limits. They must often cover numerous topics within restricted time. A clinician may complete only a few repetitions. The session may confirm tube placement on a familiar manikin without testing the entire airway-management episode. Attendance may be recorded even when individual weaknesses receive little time for correction and reassessment. 

Most importantly, a once-a-year event treats competency as a date on a calendar. HALO readiness is better understood as a condition that can strengthen or weaken between those dates. 

EMS leaders should therefore know the intervals that annual records hide: time since last practice, last simulation, last supervised clinical exposure, last field attempt, last case review, and last reassessment after a performance concern. Long gaps across several of these areas should trigger reinforcement before a patient exposes the problem. 

Annual training can remain one layer of the system. It should not be mistaken for the system itself. 

Recognizing the Exposure Gap 

The exposure problem is not evidence that paramedics are unwilling or incapable. It is a predictable consequence of asking clinicians to maintain complex procedures that occur infrequently and unevenly. 

Nor is the solution to seek invasive procedures on patients for educational purposes. Clinical decisions must remain patient-centered. The responsibility belongs to the organization to create ethical, structured opportunities for clinicians to practice, demonstrate, and reinforce performance between actual cases. 

The first leadership task is visibility. Agencies should determine how often each clinician actually encounters important procedures, how long the gaps have become, and what forms of reinforcement occur during those gaps. They should stop treating a current credential, an annual attendance record, or an agency-wide procedure total as sufficient evidence of individual readiness. 

Initial certification proves that the paramedic reached the starting line. 

Sustained competency depends on what happens afterward. 

When opportunity disappears, readiness should not be left to chance. EMS agencies must recognize that exposure, practice, performance, feedback, and time are connected. Only then can they build a system capable of keeping clinicians prepared for the rare procedure that may matter most when it finally occurs. 

The next article in this series examines the principal tool EMS uses to compensate for declining clinical exposure: simulation. It considers what simulation does exceptionally well, where the manikin stops, and why successful performance in training is important evidence of readiness but not the whole of readiness. 

AI-Assisted Editing Disclosure 

Artificial-intelligence tools were used to assist with grammar, clarity, organization, and copyediting. The author reviewed and approved the final manuscript and accepts responsibility for its content. 

References 

1. Garza AG, Gratton MC, Coontz D, Noble E, Ma OJ. Effect of paramedic experience on orotracheal intubation success rates. J Emerg Med. 2003;25(3):251-256. doi:10.1016/S0736-4679(03)00198-7. 

2. Wang HE, Seitz SR, Hostler D, Yealy DM. Defining the learning curve for paramedic student endotracheal intubation. Prehosp Emerg Care. 2005;9(2):156-162. doi:10.1080/10903120590924645. 

3. Dyson K, Bray JE, Smith K, Bernard S, Straney L, Nair R, Finn J. Paramedic intubation experience is associated with successful tube placement but not cardiac arrest survival. Ann Emerg Med. 2017;70(3):382-390.e1. doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2017.02.002. 

4. Toda J, Toda AA, Arakawa J. Learning curve for paramedic endotracheal intubation and complications. Int J Emerg Med. 2013;6:38. doi:10.1186/1865-1380-6-38. 

Dr. Ronald Rivers, DM, MBA, is a retired paramedic and the founder of Sentinel Skills Systems, Inc. located in the San Francisco Bay Area. He recently completed doctoral research at the University of Phoenix examining organizational, training, and operational factors affecting paramedic endotracheal intubation performance. His work focuses on airway competency, skill retention, simulation-based training, and EMS performance improvement.

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